Toplines
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Indian oil companies are reportedly significantly reducing direct purchases of Russian oil in the short term, and the European Union (EU) passed its 19th sanctions package against Russia, primarily targeting the Russian energy sector. Reuters reported on October 23, citing multiple trade sources, that major PRC state oil companies — including PetroChina, SinoPec, CNOOC, and Zhenhua Oil — suspended purchases of seaborne Russian oil “at least in the short term” following the October 22 US sanctions against Russian state oil company Rosneft and the private Russian oil company Lukoil.[1] Trade sources told Reuters that Rosneft and Lukoil sell most oil to the PRC indirectly by going through intermediaries, but that intendent PRC refiners are more likely to pause buying to assess the impact of sanctions. The trade sources stated that independent PRC refiners would still likely seek to purchase Russian oil despite the sanctions. Bloomberg and Reuters reported on October 23 citing refineries and industry sources that Indian oil refineries will significantly cut Russian oil imports due to the US sanctions.[2] An industry source told Reuters that India’s cut of Russian oil imports will be “massive” but not total or immediate as Indian refineries will still import some barrels of Russian crude oil through intermediaries.[3]
The EU sanctions package bans Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports into the EU beginning in January 2027 for long-term contracts and within six months (by April 23, 2026) for short-term contracts.[4] The package also targets tankers assessed to be part of the Russian shadow fleet, a United Arab Emirates (UAE) entity that serves as a conduit for the Russian shadow fleet by circumventing EU sanctions, and four PRC oil refineries. The EU also sanctioned Russian financial institutions and operators from the UAE and the PRC that supply military and dual-use goods to Russia. The EU imposed additional travel restrictions and authorization requirements for Russian diplomats and sanctioned 11 individuals involved in the illegal deportation, abduction, and militarized education of Ukrainian children.
Senior Kremlin officials publicly characterized the United States and US President Donald Trump as Russia’s adversary and “unfriendly” to Russia in response to the October 22 US sanctions against Russia’s energy sector. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on October 23 that Trump imposed these sanctions to pressure Russia and noted that the sanctions are “an unfriendly act toward Russia.”[5] Putin claimed that Trump’s actions are damaging Russian-US relations and disrupting the global energy market. Putin continued to posture Russian economic resilience regarding Western sanctions, claiming that “[Russia] feel[s] confident [and] stable despite certain losses” but noted that “there is nothing good or pleasant” about the new US sanctions against Russia — an implicit acknowledgement that the sanctions will harm Russia’s economy. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on both his English- and Russian-language Telegram accounts on October 23 that “the United States is [Russia’s] adversary” and that the United States is now fully embracing its “warpath against Russia.”[6] Medvedev added that Russia’s war in Ukraine is now Trump’s war and that the United States recent policy decisions are an “act of war against Russia.” The Kremlin typically permits Medvedev to insert hyperbolic statements into the information space that reflect the fringe of the Kremlin’s positions and directly communicate the subtext of messages from other Russian officials.[7] Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have not publicly defined the United States as Russia’s adversary during the Trump administration until October 23 and have been careful in their criticisms of the United States under the Trump administration, likely to achieve concessions in Russia’s war in Ukraine, avoid US sanctions, and attempt to conclude bilateral economic deals.[8] Putin and Medvedev’s statements are a significant rhetorical inflection that likely seek to exculpate Russia for refusing to negotiate with Ukraine or agree to ceasefires previously proposed by the United States and Ukraine.
Other Russian officials continue to posture economic resilience and the necessity of achieving Russia’s war aims, likely to prepare Russian domestic audiences for the economic impact of Western sanctions and a prolonged war effort. Russian State Duma Deputy Svetlana Zhurova claimed on October 23 that sanctions against Russia will not impact Russia’s policies – likely referring to the war in Ukraine — and that the Trump administration’s pressure against Russia does not address the issues necessary to end the war.[9] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa responded on October 22 to Trump’s criticisms of Putin’s willingness to make peace, claiming that Trump’s “blunt and sweeping” statements and cancellation of the Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest do not mean that the United States and Russia have stopped preparations for the next summit.[10] Chepa claimed that Trump’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire will have no effect as it does not address the “root causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, justifying to domestic Russian audiences Putin’s rejection of Trump’s peace efforts.[11] These statements from senior Kremlin officials and prominent Russian State Duma deputies deflect blame from Russia’s long-standing rejection of repeated attempts to progress the peace initiative in Ukraine, the actual reason for the lack of meaningful peace negotiations. Trump, when asked a question about how Putin stated that sanctions will not meaningfully impact Russia, stated, “I’m glad [Putin] feels that way. I’ll let you know about it six months from now… Let’s see how it all works out.”[12]
The Kremlin is attempting to falsely portray Russian forces as having established a bridgehead in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast – a new Russian cognitive warfare effort against Ukraine and its partners. Geolocated footage from Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo published on October 22 shows a Russian servicemember raising a flag on Karantynnyi Island in 5th Selishche Microraion in southwestern Kherson City.[13] Saldo claimed that unspecified Russian reconnaissance and airborne (VDV) units conducted an operation to cross the Dnipro River and seized a bridgehead on Karantynnyi Island. Saldo claimed that the Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks, secured a bridgehead, mined the approaches to the new Russian positions, and are now organizing logistics to Karantynnyi Island. Some Russian milbloggers amplified Saldo’s claims and credited drone operators of the 31st VDV Brigade with gaining air superiority for the Russian crossing and artillery elements of the 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) with striking Ukrainian positions on Karantynnyi Island and bridges from mainland Kherson City to the island.[14] A milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and assault groups are preparing to search for and eliminate groups of Ukrainian forces in Korabelnyi Microraion (northeastern Karantynnyi Island).[15]
Available evidence continues to indicate that Russian forces have not established a bridgehead or begun an offensive in west bank Kherson Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade published footage on October 23 that ISW geolocated showing Ukrainian forces freely operating in Kherson City’s Ostriv Microraion (on Karantynnyi Island immediately north of 5th Selishche Microraion).[16] The Ukrainian brigade reported that Karantynnyi Island and the areas of Antonivka and Sadove (both east of Kherson City on the west bank) are “silent” and that Russian forces are not operating on the west bank of the Dnipro River. A Russian milblogger focusing on the Kherson direction recently claimed that Russian forces conducted sabotage and reconnaissance operations near Antonivka and Sadove and forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Sadove – claims that are not supported by any available reporting of Russian operations.[17] Russia is likely conducting a cognitive warfare effort to portray limited Russian sabotage and reconnaissance operations in the Kherson direction as the start of a dedicated Russian offensive to cross the Dnipro River and recapture Kherson City and Oblast.[18] The Kremlin likely intends to convince the West, European Union (EU), and Ukraine that a Russian victory is inevitable such that Ukraine should submit to Russia’s demands to cede territory and that allies should stop supporting Ukraine.[19] ISW continues to assess that this Russian cognitive warfare effort is incompatible with any claim that Russia is willing to make territorial concessions in southern Ukraine.[20]
Russian forces continue to increase the frequency of mechanized assaults in eastern and southern Ukraine, likely to take advantage of rainy and foggy weather conditions that complicate Ukrainian drone operations. Geolocated footage published on October 23 shows a Russian roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized and motorized assault toward Siversk from Serebryanka (north of Siversk) and Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[21] A Ukrainian drone battalion that repelled the assault reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a tank, three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), three buggies, and roughly 20 motorcycles in the assault.[22] Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on October 23 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in Chasiv Yar, destroying two MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and killing roughly 40 Russian servicemembers.[23] Weather monitoring services indicate that the Siversk and Chasiv Yar areas experienced cloudy conditions on October 23, and that it rained in Chasiv Yar on October 23.[24] Russian forces conducted an at least reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) on October 22 as the area experienced cloud cover.[25] ISW observed that Russian forces exploited precipitation to conduct a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv) on October 20.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are exploiting poor weather conditions to conduct mechanized assaults as foggy and rainy conditions degrade the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone surveillance and strikes.[27] The season change to autumn is also reportedly making drones more effective by depriving Russian soldiers of some concealment. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that the autumnal lack of foliage is complicating Russian forces’ ability to evade Ukrainian drones.[28]
Ukraine’s partners continue to support Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative to purchase US military equipment for Ukraine. Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo announced on October 23 that Finland will allocate 100 million euros (about $116 million) in its first contribution to the PURL initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Spain is joining the PURL initiative.[29]
Russian forces continue to target and kill civilians, first responders, and journalists. The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on October 23 that Russian forces executed at least four civilians sheltering in private homes in Zvanivka, Bakhmutsky Raion on October 20, 2025.[30] Russian soldiers have committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in occupied Ukraine, and ISW continues to assess that Russian battlefield commanders enable and even order atrocities including summary executions.[31] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on October 23 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against first responders in Zelenyi Hai, Kharkiv Oblast, killing one first responder and injuring five others.[32] Russian forces have conducted double-tap strikes targeting first responders in Ukraine to spread fear among Ukrainian civilians and maximize the degree of casualties and damage from Russian strike series in Ukraine. [33]
Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on October 23. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on October 23 that Russia released 1,000 bodies that it claimed belonged to deceased Ukrainian servicemembers.[34] Ukraine’s “I Want to Find” project reported on October 23 that Ukraine released the bodies of 31 KIA Russian servicemembers.[35]
Key Takeaways
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Indian oil companies are reportedly significantly reducing direct purchases of Russian oil in the short term, and the European Union (EU) passed its 19th sanctions package against Russia, primarily targeting the Russian energy sector.
- Senior Kremlin officials publicly characterized the United States and US President Donald Trump as Russia’s adversary and “unfriendly” to Russia in response to the October 22 US sanctions against Russia’s energy sector.
- The Kremlin is attempting to falsely portray Russian forces as having established a bridgehead in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast – a new Russian cognitive warfare effort against Ukraine and its partners.
- Available evidence continues to indicate that Russian forces have not established a bridgehead or begun an offensive in west bank Kherson Oblast.
- Russian forces continue to increase the frequency of mechanized assaults in eastern and southern Ukraine, likely to take advantage of rainy and foggy weather conditions that complicate Ukrainian drone operations.
- Ukraine’s partners continue to support Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative to purchase US military equipment for Ukraine.
- Russian forces continue to target and kill civilians, first responders, and journalists.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on October 23.
- Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Velykomykhailivka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial enterprises overnight on October 23 and 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 23 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Rosneft Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of October 22 to 23.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported the refinery has an annual production capacity of 17 million tons. Geolocated footage published on October 23 shows a fire at the facility and indicates that Ukrainian forces struck the facility’s AVT-2 Crude Distillation Unit.[37] Russian opposition outlet ASTRA noted that the strike is the fifth against the refinery in 2025.[38] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that drone debris caused property damage at an unspecified enterprise.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 23 that Ukrainian drone operators destroyed a Russian ammunition depot near Valuyki, Belgorod Oblast on the night of October 22 to 23.[40]
Chelyabinsk Oblast Governor Alexey Teksler claimed on October 23 that an explosion at the Plastmass munitions plant in Kopeysk, Chelyabinsk Oblast killed twelve people and injured 19.[41] Russian authorities denied reports of Ukrainian drones and attributed the explosion to safety violations.[42] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the Plastmass plant is owned by Technodinamika, a subsidiary of state-owned Rostec.[43] A Ukrainian open-source analyst reported on October 23 that the explosion destroyed the plant and Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi noted that the plant is located 1,800 kilometers from the Ukraine’s international border.[44]
Russian milbloggers claimed on October 22 that an explosive device detonated near the military base of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) in Stavropol, Krasnodar Krai and attributed the incident to sabotage.[45]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 23 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Stepne and north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, on October 22 and 23.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kostyantynivka, Kindrativka (both north of Sumy City), Oleksiivka, and Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[47]
A Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military command for continuing to order assaults in Sumy Oblast even though Russian forces are not advancing rapidly and suffering heavy casualties.[48] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are targeting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) southeast of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) and near Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City in the Ukrainian near rear).[49]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), likely motorized rifle elements, continue to relieve elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City).[50] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 5th Airborne (VDV) Battalion of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly conducting counter-drone operations in the Sumy direction.[51]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 23 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[52]
Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Tykhe on October 22 and 23.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove, Tykhe, and Vovchanski Khutory (south of Tyke).[54]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces accused Russian commanders of exaggerating Russian advances near Synelynkove in official reports.[55] The milblogger argued that the sum of these Russian reports’ incremental gains, if they were true, would add up to Russian forces having advanced about 11 kilometers in the Synelnykove area since September 1, but that in reality the frontline has not changed. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command sends undertrained infantry, including sick or injured soldiers pulled from hospitals, on attritional assaults based on these false reports.
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported that Russian forces have lost at least 15,000 killed-in-action in the Vovchansk direction since May 2024.[56] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces assault in waves and conduct air and artillery strikes when Ukrainian forces push back Russian forces, and that Vovchansk is nearly completely destroyed. The spokesperson noted that a significant portion of Russian soldiers operating in the Vovchansk direction are penal recruits.
Order of Battle: Mortar crews of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vovchansk.[57] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Bati Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[58]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 23 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Ambarne and east of Velykyi Burluk near Bolohivka on October 22 and 23.[59]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Bolohivka is a contested “gray zone.”[60]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2
Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk along the Pivdenna Railroad and in western Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[61]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Kupyansk and have encircled Ukrainian forces in the innermost center of Kupyansk.[62]
Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk toward Kolodyazne; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Stroivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on October 22 and 23.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk).[64]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kuypansk direction reported on October 23 that the Russian military command continues to order near-constant, highly attritional assaults and that Russian forces largely consist of penal recruits with minimal training and equipment.[65] The spokesperson noted that Russian soldiers are resorting to extreme methods to offset water shortages due to the Russian forces’ inability to establish and maintain logistics. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian artillery elements destroyed a Ukrainian bridge over the Oskil River near Petrivka (just south of Kupyansk).[66]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction, including east of Borova near Nadiia, on October 23 but did not advance.[67]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 23 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milboggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Lyman itself, in central Yarova, north of Drobysheve (both northwest of Lyman), and northwest of Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[68]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, Derylove, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Stavky; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on October 22 and 23.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksandrivka, Serednie, and Korovyi Yar (all northwest of Lyman).[70]
A Russian milblogger claimed that half of Stavky is a contested “gray zone.”[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]), struck Ukrainian forces during an attempt to repair a pontoon crossing over the Siverskyi Donets River near Raihorodok (southwest of Lyman).[72]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[73]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Siversk during a mechanized assault (see topline for additional details).[74]
Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Fedorivka on October 22 and 23.[75]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Shcherbynivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[76]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on October 22 that Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in western Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka), refuting other Russian claims that Russian forces seized the settlement as of July 4.[77]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Bila Hora, Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka on October 22 and 23.[78]
The Kramatorsk City Council reported on October 23 that Russian forces conducted three fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Kramatorsk (northwest of Kostyantynivka), damaging residential buildings.[79]
Order of Battle: Orlan-30 reconnaissance drone operators of the Russian 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade continue to coordinate artillery strikes with the 1st Krasnodar Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (both 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) against Ukrainian forces in Ivanopillya.[80] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) and 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC, under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating near Predtechyne.[81]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 23 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and west of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya) to the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway.[82]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on October 22 and 23.[83]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on October 23 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of, on the western and eastern outskirts of, and in western and northern Pokrovsk; in eastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk); and north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions in southern Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk), refuting Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that Russian forces seized the settlement on October 20.[85]
Geolocated footage published on October 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in central Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration event.[86] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
Russian forces attacked in and near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Balahan, Kozatske, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 22 and 23.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrnohrad.[88]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces within Pokrovsk avoid assembling large concentrations of infantry, due to the threat of drone and artillery strikes.[89]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment and positions near Myrnohrad.[90] Artillery elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[91]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 23 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka.[92]
Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on October 22 and 23.[93]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on October 23 that the Russian military command instructs Russian servicemembers to commit suicide rather than surrender, claiming that Ukrainian forces mistreat Russian prisoners of war (POWs).[94]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[95]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove, east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka toward Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Vyshneve on October 22 and 23.[96]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian mechanized brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on October 23 that Russian forces are constantly changing tactics but remain committed to advancing and gaining a foothold on the administrative boundaries of the Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts.[97] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue to rely largely on small fireteams to probe for weaknesses in Ukrainian defenses in highly attritional missions.
A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Kolomiitsi (west of Velykomykhailivka), likely as part of condition setting to prepare for Russian ground operations.[98]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the south Dnipropetrovsk (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[99]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 23 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Pryvilne (northeast of Hulyaipole) and east of Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole).[100]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Pavlivka, Novohryhorivka, Novovasylivske, Malynivka, Okhotnyche, and Novomykolaivka and toward Pryvilne on October 22 and 23.[101]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to draw Russian forces away from Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) by counterattacking in unspecified nearby areas.[102]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 23 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Novodanylivka (southwest of Orikhiv) and in central Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[103] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 22 that Russian forces advanced south of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[104]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, west of Orikhiv near Stepove and Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on October 22 and 23.[105]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are taking up new positions near Robotyne and repositioning near Nesteryanka (south and southwest of Orikhiv, respectively).[106]
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Mariano Grossi announced on October 23 that authorities successfully reconnected the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to the Ukrainian power grid following repairs to the Dniprovska line during a localized ceasefire, ending the ZNPP’s month-long reliance on back-up diesel generators.[107] Grossi noted that the IAEA is working with both Ukraine and Russia to coordinate ongoing repair efforts for the ZNPP’s Ferosplavna-1 line – another one of the ZNPP’s ten power lines. Grossi reported that the ZNPP’s Ferosplavna-1 line was disabled on May 7, 2025.
Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on October 22 and 23 but did not advance.[108]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in Karantynnyi Island (in southwestern Kherson City) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[109] (See topline text for additional details.)
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 130 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strikes drones, including about 80 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[110] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 92 drones and that 25 drones hit 11 locations and drone debris struck 11 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged energy infrastructure in Novhorod-Siverskyi Raion, Chernihiv Oblast and Lozovskyi Raion, Kharkiv Oblast, leaving about 30,000 subscribers without energy in Kharkiv Oblast.[111] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that Russian strikes damaged residential buildings in Kyiv City and injured nine civilians.[112] Sumy City Military Administration Head Serhiy Krivosheienko reported that Russian forces also struck the Sumy City railway station.[113] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported that 12 Ukrainian oblasts introduced power outage schedules due to damage from the Russian strikes.[114]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarus is strengthening military cooperation and import substitution initiatives with Iran. Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee reported on October 23 that State Committee for Military Industry Chairman Dmitry Pantus met with Iranian officials to discuss further military-technical cooperation and cooperation through import substitution and strengthened technological sovereignty.[115]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-state-oil-majors-suspend-russian-oil-buys-due-sanctions-sources-say-2025-10-23/?utm_source=braze&utm_medium=notifications&utm_campaign=2025_engagement
[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-23/russian-oil-supply-to-india-set-to-fall-to-near-zero-sources; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/indian-refiners-review-russian-oil-contracts-after-us-sanctions-source-says-2025-10-23/
[3] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/indian-refiners-review-russian-oil-contracts-after-us-sanctions-source-says-2025-10-23/
[4] https://www.consilium.europa dot eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/23/19th-package-of-sanctions-against-russia-eu-targets-russian-energy-third-country-banks-and-crypto-providers/; https://t.me/sotaproject/104553; https://x.com/kajakallas/status/1981247936177545661
[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78275
[6] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/613 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/102
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-9/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-22/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_3-17/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16-23/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare
[9] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/10/23/v-rossii-ob-yasnili-izmenenie-podhoda-ssha-k-uregulirovaniyu-ukrainskogo-konflikta/
[10] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/10/23/v-rossii-vyskazalis-o-buduschem-otnosheniy-s-ssha-posle-otmeny-vstrechi-v-budapeshte/
[11] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/10/23/prizyv/
[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-sanctions-russian-oil-majors-prompting-oil-price-rise-india-jitters-2025-10-23/; https://x.com/Archer83Able/status/1981465887291961719
[13] https://x.com/nimda_qa/status/1981282715212415422; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/11092
[14] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35342; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/29920;https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/29924; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/29927; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/29928
[15] https://t.me/PROSVETINFORM/17909
[16] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1CRzf6WGJh/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2025/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2025/
[21] https://t.me/apachi_fpv/486; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1981338997507973519; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10319
[22] https://t.me/apachi_fpv/486
[23] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uu50wPIJ4ps; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/23/znyshhyly-protyvnyka-i-czym-pyshayemos-syly-oborony-prodovzhuyut-oboronyaty-chasiv-yar/
[24] https://www.ventusky dot com/?p=48.868;38.011;11&l=clouds-total; https://www.ventusky dot com/?p=48.624;37.949;10&l=clouds-total [please see options at the bottom to adjust date and time]; https://meteofor dot com.ua/ru/weather-chasiv-yar-13230/month/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/; https://www.ventusky dot com/?p=48.310;37.275;11&l=clouds-total&t=20251022/1800 [please see options at the bottom to adjust date and time]
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2025/
[28] https://t.me/ombr66/2084; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/22/spryyaye-znyshhennyu-okupantiv-osin-vnesla-korektyvy-v-harakter-boyiv-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/
[29] https://archive dot is/VzGk2; https://suspilne dot media/1146440-ispania-finansuvatime-zakupivlu-amerikanskoi-zbroi-dla-ukraini-cerez-nato/; https://suspilne dot media/1146642-ispania-i-finlandia-priednalis-do-zakupivel-amerikanskoi-zbroi-dla-ukraini/; https://www.hs dot fi/politiikka/art-2000011578252.html; https://suspilne dot media/1146642-ispania-i-finlandia-priednalis-do-zakupivel-amerikanskoi-zbroi-dla-ukraini/
[30] https://t.me/Donetsk_obl_prokuratura/4670
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-may-5-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-28-2025; https://isw.pub/OccupationUpdate050125
[32]https://www.facebook.com/DSNSKHARKIV/posts/pfbid0tzBMxPfRfEykmiARC5SQ18ssBG9xy8LCDCUGCCqtUzwqcGHvfcoq2BFogEfQQgbvl; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1145934-ratuvalnik-zaginuv-pid-cas-povtornogo-udaru-rf-na-harkivsini-patero-jogo-koleg-poraneni/ ;
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2025/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2025
[34] https://t.me/Koord_shtab/15735
[35] https://t.me/hochunaiti_com/2352
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30592
[37] https://x.com/GarbuzYe/status/1981259446400499745; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1981240887293464899
[38] https://t.me/astrapress/95396
[39] https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/5335
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30592
[41] https://t.me/alexeytexlerofficial/2919; https://t.me/alexeytexlerofficial/2917
[42] https://t.me/alexeytexlerofficial/2912; https://t.me/alexeytexlerofficial/2913; https://t.me/alexeytexlerofficial/2915; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8141404
[43] https://t.me/astrapress/95368
[44] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/explosion-at-plastmass-factory-1-800-km-from-ukraine-production-facilities-destroyed/ ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/44833
[45] https://t.me/shot_shot/88177; https://t.me/motopatriot78/43557 ; https://t.me/dontstopwar/23007 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/184237
[46] https://t.me/severnnyi/5489 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574
[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/30026; https://t.me/rusich_army/26430; https://t.me/dva_majors/81895
[48] https://t.me/dva_majors/81895
[49] https://t.me/rusich_army/26430
[50] https://t.me/severnnyi/5489; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/
[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35342
[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/345220
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35333; https://t.me/wargonzo/30026; https://t.me/rybar/74617
[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35333; https://t.me/rybar/74617
[55] https://t.me/severnnyi/5496
[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/23/perestupayut-cherez-pobratymiv-hodyat-po-trupah-u-vovchansku-ne-zupynyayutsya-shturmy-boyi-tochatsya-za-pidvaly/
[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/17363; https://t.me/wargonzo/30054
[58] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6121
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574; https://t.me/wargonzo/30026; https://t.me/rybar/74617
[60] https://t.me/rybar/74617
[61] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1981126499458793689; https://t.me/angrydrones/217 ; https://t.me/armycorps12/1074 ; https://x.com/TeeterSweeper/status/1981091692012064957
[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43576
[63] https://t.me/wargonzo/30026 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574
[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/30026
[65] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/23/kavu-secheyu-rozbavlyayut-shhob-yakos-popyty-poblyzu-kupyanska-vorozhi-shturmovyky-strazhdayut-vid-znevodnennya/
[66] https://t.me/operationall_space/7222 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/159026
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595
[68] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68340; https://t.me/motopatriot78/43588
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574 https://t.me/wargonzo/30026 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68340
[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68340
[71] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43578
[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/184334; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35353; https://t.me/operationall_space/7214; https://t.me/milinfolive/159026
[73] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43600
[74] https://t.me/apachi_fpv/486; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10319
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35335
[76] https://www.instagram.com/reels/DQI6XPYAq16/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1981318839422841034
[77] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025/ ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/43548
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574; https://t.me/motopatriot78/43548; https://t.me/wargonzo/30026; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35335
[79] https://t.me/kramatorsk_rada/24279; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/23/vorog-sogodni-trychi-vdaryv-po-kramatorsku-dronamy-na-optovolokni/
[80] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1981312808693215331; https://t.me/KubanArtilery/1440
[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43548
[82] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32660
[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574; https://t.me/wargonzo/30026; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35332
[84] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32663; https://t.me/motopatriot78/43555; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32666; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68336; https://t.me/rybar/74590
[85] https://t.me/rybar/74590; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/
[86] https://t.me/assault_battalion_3_92SABr/180; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10312
[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574; https://t.me/dva_majors/81852; https://t.me/motopatriot78/43593; https://t.me/wargonzo/30026; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35354; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68336; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35353
[88] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35354
[89] https://t.me/rybar/74590
[90] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14458
[91] https://t.me/wargonzo/30023
[92] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32669
[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574
[94] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/23/u-nyh-vyluchaly-kartky-samogubcziv-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosijski-komandyry-prodovzhuyut-utylizovuvaty-svoyih-soldativ/
[95] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1190490859798018; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10317
[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574 ; https://t.me/rybar/74588
[97] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/10/23/u-nyh-vyluchaly-kartky-samogubcziv-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosijski-komandyry-prodovzhuyut-utylizovuvaty-svoyih-soldativ/
[98] https://t.me/voin_dv/17361
[99] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/184347
[100] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32678 ; https://t.me/rybar/74588
[101] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574 ; https://t.me/rybar/74588 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30026
[102] https://t.me/rybar/74588
[103] https://t.me/rusich_army/26439 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68342
[104] https://t.me/rybar/74591
[105] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/81852 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68342 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30026 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35335
[106] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68342 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30026 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35335
[107] https://www.iaea dot org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-323-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine
[108] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30595 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30576 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30574
[109] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1CRzf6WGJh/; https://t [dot] me/HersonEnot/10036; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1981387850999615888; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1981385880960200924
[110] https://t.me/kpszsu/45368
[111]https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/pfbid0koLLxRiSx625Q8HAJryyAgHvtqVYsyWgqupjZyVoAGXUmYGw2j6HeM29bWcfcciEl; https://suspilne dot media/1145878-rf-atakuvala-kiiv-e-postrazdali-ssa-pogodili-sankcii-proti-rosii-1338-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1761201093&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/synegubov/17921
[112] https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1939; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1934; https://t.me/kyiv_pro_office/7940; https://armyinform dot com dot ua/2025/10/23/u-kyyevi-vnaslidok-obstriliv-rf-semero-postrazhdalyh/; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1145938-poskodzeni-budivli-i-postrazdali-ludi-naslidki-rosijskoi-nicnoi-ataki-kieva/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/95377 ; https://t.me/severrealii/31892; https://armyinform dot com dot ua/2025/10/23/najbilshe-postrazhdav-podil-naslidky-rosijskogo-obstrilu-kyyeva/
[113] https://t.me/serhii_kryvosheienko/642; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1145906-rosijskij-bezpilotnik-vdariv-po-zaliznicnij-stancii-v-sumah/ ;
[114] https://suspilne dot media/1146118-v-ukraini-u-12-oblastah-diut-grafiki-znestrumlen-ukrenergo/
[115] https://vpk dot gov.by/news/comm_news/vizit-delegatsii-goskomvoenproma-v-iran-novyy-impuls-dlya-sotrudnichestva.html?sphrase_id=259580
